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Fine-grained memory protection 
ABSTRACT 
Aside from malicious software gaining access and corrupting sections of computer 
memory, even legitimate software can inadvertently overwrite and damage its own memory 
content. Memory protection units exist that enable programmers to cordon off sensitive sections 
of memory. However, there is currently no mechanism to protect sensitive memory from code 
running in the same address space as that of the memory. Further, software that runs in 
privileged mode can change protection status of memory regions by modifying registers of the 
memory protection unit itself. 
This disclosure provides a mechanism for protected memory to be accessible by code 
segments that are specifically authorized to do so. Per the techniques described herein, a 
protected memory region includes addresses of protected memory and addresses of code-space 
that is authorized to access such protected memory. An instruction that requests access to 
protected memory is tested for authorization. If such authorization succeeds, execution of the 
instruction continues uninterrupted, else an exception is thrown. 
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BACKGROUND 
There is generally some chance that software can potentially corrupt contents of its own 
writable memory. This is especially true for single-address space applications written in 
languages such as C/C++, which are by design close to machine-level language for purposes of 
efficiency, and which have no built-in overwrite protections. Examples of single-address space 
applications include OS kernels, bare-metal embedded software running a microcontroller, etc. 
For software that runs under the protection of a memory management unit (MMU), e.g., 
user applications, OS kernels, etc., code areas are protected from corruption, as they typically 
only have read permission. However, writable data sections and memory-mapped I/O areas can 
be modified unintentionally. For bare-metal embedded software running a microcontroller with 
no MMU support, even code areas are not free of the possibility of corruption. Although a 
memory protection unit (MPU) can be used to reduce the chances of accidental corruption, 
software running in privileged mode can inadvertently or deliberately corrupt registers of the 
MPU itself, resulting in disablement of the MPU. 
To the extent that an MMU provides memory protection by partitioning memory on a 
per-application basis, it does so at the page level, typically 4 kilobytes or larger. An MPU 
provides memory protection at the region level, typically 32 bytes or larger. Although an MMU 
is typically used to provide data protection/isolation between multiple virtual address spaces, it 
can in theory be used to provide data protection within the same address space. For example, by 
dynamically mapping/unmapping pages of virtual memory, data structures or I/O registers 
encapsulated by a given code module can be made visible upon entry to the public routines of the 
module and hidden upon exit from the public routines of the module.  
This approach requires protected data structures (or I/O registers) to be in their own 
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memory pages, as the MMU only provides page-level granularity of protection. A similar 
approach can be implemented using an MPU. However, existing MMUs/MPUs do not support 
restricting access to a given memory address range from code modules running in the same 
address space. 
It is thus observed that once access is granted to a given address range, any part of the 
code running in the same address space can access that address range, thereby opening a security 
loophole or possibility of malfunction. The problem is therefore one of providing fine-grained 
data protection or isolation from code within the same address space. 
DESCRIPTION 
This disclosure provides techniques that restrict access to a given address range to 
specifically authorized code modules or segments. Per the techniques, a given code module with 
encapsulated internal data or I/O registers is authorized to access such data or I/O registers. 
Access from other code triggers an access violation exception. Similarly, invocation of safety-
critical or security-sensitive code is restricted to an expected set of callers. Calls from other 
modules trigger an access violation exception, which is handled suitably by the OS. 
A memory-protection unit (MPU) has a programming interface to specify regions of 
memory that are privileged, e.g., protected from reading and/or writing and/or execution, by 
applications other than privileged applications. Examples of privileged applications include 
kernel processes, processes owned by a root user, etc. 
Per techniques of this disclosure, a memory-protection unit is augmented with registers 
that enable programmers to specify regions of code-space that are authorized to access a 
protected region of memory. Protected memory can include memory that stores data or code. If 
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code resides in protected memory, execution of such code is subject to the caller having 
authorization to do so. 
 
Fig. 1: Memory protection unit with use of authorized code registers 
Fig. 1 illustrates an example memory protection unit with provision for specifying 
authorized code segments, per techniques of this disclosure. The memory protection unit (100) 
includes one or more region descriptor sub-units (102a-c), each pertaining to a certain region of 
memory. Within a region descriptor, protected memory space (also known as target memory 
region) is identified by registers indicating a start-address (104), an end-address (106), and the 
nature of permissions (108) granted, e.g., read and/or write and/or execute. Code that is 
authorized to access the protected region of memory is identified by a start-address register (110) 
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and an end-address register (112). Alternately, regions of protected memory space and 
authorized code-space can be specified by a start-address register and a size register. 
MPU registers, e.g., as in Fig. 1, are writable by privileged code, e.g., kernel code, but 
not ordinarily by user applications. If a user application requires access to these registers, such 
application code can make system calls to do so. Direct access to MPU registers by user 
applications, e.g., bypassing the invocation of a system call, causes an exception.  
A developer of kernel or other privileged code accesses the MPU registers using 
specifically designed APIs. Alternately, source code can be annotated with pragmas (e.g., 
compiler or preprocessor directives) to indicate protected regions of memory and corresponding 
authorized segments of code. Still alternately, kernel developers can leverage the compiler, with 
its built-in knowledge of the target architecture and memory map, to generate code that populates 
the registers of the MPU. Using the compiler to thus set up protected memory regions and 
authorize code segments during the start-up phase of a program enables the programmer to 
achieve superior memory protection with almost no additional programming burden. 
 
Fig. 2: Memory protection unit as a hardware module 
  
 Architecturally, the MPU can be implemented as a hardware module (202) situated 
between a CPU core (204) and memory (206), as shown in Fig. 2. The MPU intercepts memory 
accesses (e.g., memory loads/stores) from the CPU and determines if the code requesting access 
to a particular region of memory is authorized to do so. If a code instruction is authorized, e.g., 
the location of the instruction falls within the start and end addresses of the authorized code 
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regions (as illustrated in Fig. 1), the instruction is permitted to access the memory without 
interruption.  
If a memory-access attempt is made by code located outside of the authorized code range, 
the CPU triggers an access protection fault exception. The hardware module that includes the 
MPU can be advantageously integrated onto the same semiconductor chip that includes the CPU, 
e.g., integrated with the CPU core. In the case of smaller microcontrollers, the mechanism 
described herein can be advantageously integrated into an existing MPU. In the case of a larger 
processor or ASIC, the mechanisms described herein can be advantageously integrated into an 
existing memory management unit (MMU).  
 
Fig. 3: Determination of whether an instruction is authorized to access a memory location 
 Fig. 3 illustrates an example procedure for an MPU to determine if an instruction is 
authorized to access a particular memory location. Upon receipt of an instruction (302), e.g., an 
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instruction to load from or store into a certain memory location, the MPU tests if the memory to 
be accessed lies within a protected region (304). If the memory location does not lie within a 
protected region, the instruction executes without interruption (308). If the memory location lies 
within a protected memory region, the program counter is checked to see if it includes a code-
instruction address that lies within an authorized code region (306). If the program counter 
includes a code-instruction address that lies within an authorized code region, then the 
instruction executes without interruption (308), else an exception is thrown (310). 
Example scenarios where the techniques of this disclosure apply include: 
● Single-address space applications such as kernel or other privileged code. 
● User applications running within a single section of a multi-address memory map.  
● Relatively small microcontrollers running bare-metal operating systems on physical 
memories. 
● Larger microprocessors utilizing heavy-weight operating systems, virtual memory, and 
memory management units to partition memory into mutually isolated multiple sections, 
each such memory section allocated to a single application.  
● Device drivers, implemented such that device-driver code, and no other code, is 
authorized to access memory-mapped I/O registers of the corresponding peripheral.  
● Safety or security-critical code, such that only authorized callers can invoke such code. 
Device drivers, bare-metal/ heavy-weight operating systems (and kernels thereof), 
microcontrollers/ microprocessors running single or multi-address space applications, etc. are 
found almost ubiquitously. The techniques of this disclosure therefore apply to most consumer 
devices, e.g., laptops, desktops, mobile devices, IoT devices, medical equipment, security 
devices, etc.  
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CONCLUSION 
Aside from malicious software gaining access and corrupting sections of computer 
memory, even legitimate software can inadvertently overwrite and damage its own memory 
content. Memory protection units exist that enable programmers to cordon off sensitive sections 
of memory. However, there is currently no mechanism to protect sensitive memory from code 
running in the same address space as that of the memory. Further, software that runs in 
privileged mode can change protection status of memory regions by modifying registers of the 
memory protection unit itself. 
This disclosure provides a mechanism for protected memory to be accessible by code 
segments that are specifically authorized to do so. Per the techniques described herein, a 
protected memory region includes addresses of protected memory and addresses of code-space 
that is authorized to access such protected memory. An instruction that requests access to 
protected memory is tested for authorization. If such authorization succeeds, execution of the 
instruction continues uninterrupted, else an exception is thrown. 
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